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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE RECENT CAPITAL FLOWS TO BRAZIL: ANY HOPES FOR CHANGE?

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## CONTENTS

Page

1. Motivation ..... 1
2. Foreign Direct Investment to Brazil

- Aggregate behavior ..... 2
2.1 Historical perspective ..... 2
2.2 Macroeconomic context of the recent inflows ..... 4
2.3 Supply ..... 5
2.4 Domestic incentives ..... 6
2.5 Volatility and the response to short run incentives ..... 10

3. The timing of entry and the composition11
3.1 Uncertainty and the cost of waiting ..... 11
interest parity ..... 14
3.3 Quality of the capital flows ..... 15
3.4 Econometric evidence on the long run effect of FDI ..... 15
4. Sectoral aspects of FDI ..... 16
5. Policy conclusions and pending issues ..... 17
Annex 1 ..... 20

# FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE RECENT CAPITAL FLOWS TO BRAZIL: ANY HOPES FOR CHANGE?* 

## 1. Motivation

There was a significant increase in capital inflows to Brazil in the nineties. Were investors only after a quick gain because of interest rates differentials far beyond perceptions of country risk or are there signals that they may contribute to an increase in the growth prospects? A convincing answer to this question depends both on a view on the elements behind these movements, acting on the supply and the demand-side of the recent flows and the effects the latter may have on growth constraints: on investment, on savings, and on the foreign exchange restrictions which are likely to bind Brazilian economic growth in the next years.

This paper examines some characteristics of the recent inflows against the background of past experience and focuses on the elements pertaining to policy uncertainty which has pervaded the Brazilian experience. Section 2 deals with aggregate description of the capital account and briefly assesses the fall in investment which occurred in the Brazilian economy, updating some information and analysis contained in Carneiro and Werneck (1993).

Since recovery in the investment ratio has been slow, we should not expect much from the aggregate impact of recent flows on investment. Before examining long run consequences, two warnings may be given: first, since Brazil has come late both in external debt rescheduling (Brady agreement was in 1994) and stabilization (first minimally successful attempt is only less than two-years old), there has been not much time for a noticeable structural change in the quality of flows. Much less for a significant change in real investment which may be attributed to the foreign capital

[^0]inflows. Even so, a preliminary attempt is made at exploring the responsiveness of the quality of flows to a measure of risk premium derived from an investment decision model described in section 3.


#### Abstract

In Section 4 there is a description of the sectoral data that is available and possible empirical explorations which may be attempted if some difficulties with the quality of capital stock data can be overcome. Section 5 raises policy issues which may be eventually explored.


2. Foreign Direct Investment to Brazil - Aggregate behavior

### 2.1 Historical perspective

From the 70 s to the 80 s there was a dramatic change in the domestic investment pattern. Data on current and constant prices gross fixed investment as a GDP ratio can be seen in table 2.3. Gross fixed investment in current prices shows a decrease from an average of $22 \%$ of GDP in the last five years of the 70 s to $16.9 \%$ of GDP in 1984. From this year on, there was a surprisingly upward trend of the investment ratio to a high of $24.9 \%$ in 1989, in view of high uncertainty brought about by high inflation and unsuccessful stabilization attempts since the Cruzado plan.

When one looks to the constant prices ratio series, this upward trend is not observed. In current prices, the investment ratio hit its all time low in 1984, ( $15.7 \%$ of GDP). The conclusion is that in 1980 prices, however, the apparent recovery showed by current prices accounting hide a sharp relative price increase of capital goods and construction. Reasons are the high uncertainty concerning the legal value of contractual indexation following the Cruzado experiments, plus high relative price of imported capital goods, maybe because of less suppliers credit, plus lack of
official and multilateral financing, which traditionally supported long run investment projects.

If one considers the picture on the side of savings, it looks even worse. The reason is that public savings have not recovered from its slump in the eighties, in the absence of fiscal adjustment. Public savings averaged in the 70 s $7.6 \%$ of GDP and fell during the 80 s to $-1.31 \%$ in 1989. In contrast to what happened in the 70s, when abundant foreign finance financed the rise of domestic investment, in the 80 s the contribution of foreign investment was very small and negative at the end of the decade. As foreign savings fell during the 80 s, investment was to be financed by the domestic private sector.

Resumption of high rates of growth cannot thus be warranted, in this context. Even after macropolicies became more sensible after 1991, presence and dominance of short run capital and the need of high interest rates to attract it should not come as a surprise.

Between 1987 and 1990, the Brazilian balance of payments current account showed a surplus (see table 2.2). Brazil had to adapt growth possibilities and invest less since investment was bound by (lower) savings minus foreign transfers as she did not qualify for new balance of payments finance. Because of the suspension of debt-related payments under an official moratorium declared in early 1987, financial as well as real resource transfers became negative. Virtually without any foreign exchange reserves, actually interest payments to private debtors were made throughout the period on the basis allowed by current account surplus. FDI explains the capital account surplus showed in 1988, thanks essentially to debt conversions of almost US\$ 3 billion. Actually, profit remittances show a record high level in the moratorium years.

From 1989 to 1991 net foreign investment (including reinvestment) averaged less than 500 million per year. Only after the real devaluation of 1991, the sharp increase in domestic interest rates and the recovery in international reserves, direct investment showed its first significant increase in almost ten years.

### 2.2 Macroeconomic context of the recent inflows

The behavior of net flows and components in 1990-95 are shown on tables 2.5 through 2.7. Share of FDI in capital inflows was high before the seventies, whereas loans became increasingly important in the 1975/82 years of high debt growth..After the external debt crash, debt conversion was expected to be the main source of FDI flows. Official debt conversion was relatively small in the eighties, but even so, it explains most of foreign direct investment, at least how come it did not become even smaller. Legislation and the failure to renegotiate external debt in early Brady both play a role. In 1990, the Collor pro-market stance did not help much because of the drastic intervention in financial markets. In spite of the privatization moves and the important trade liberalization reforms, only after Marcilio Moreira economic team worked hard to restore policy credibility foreign exchange reserves were restored.

Dominant features: consequences of low credibility following the failure of Collor experiments. Two tasks: overcome low confidence: devaluation and increase in interest rates. High reserves were necessary for recovery of governance and confidence in policy design after Collor interventions; high interest rates were necessary to allow the voluntary holding of public debt.

### 2.3 Supply

Since the late seventies, there has been a growing mobility of international capital. The share of Brazil decreased significantly in the eighties as protracted renegotiation of the external debt prevented participation of Brazil in the increase of flows to developing countries which happened in the second half of the eighties and the early nineties. By the end of the 1980s, Brazil received less than $0,6 \%$ of $F D I$ in the world ( $14.6 \%$ of the flows to Latin America) compared with $6.2 \%$ in the end of the seventies (30.5\% to Latin America).

Following a brief albeit serious reversion in the positive trend at the time of the international debt crisis, the first half of the nineties witnessed a substantial growth in capital flows across the borders, as dominant risks were perceived to be increasingly country-specific and no longer systemic. Three additional reasons may help to explain the higher volume of migrating capital: the decrease in costs of portfolio movements with the generalization of globalized trading, the ability of fund managers to persuade investors of their timely evaluation of expected gains and associated risks, and a trend to liberalize exchange markets almost everywhere.

As a result, a positive chain of reactions was made possible. Flows have become larger and more volatile, posing problems to monetary authorities in view of the disparities between the size of foreign exchange resexves in the vaults of Central Banks, as compared with the potential volume of capital that is available to cross foreign exchange markets. A good portion of the liberalization wave may in its turn be attributed to the recognition by local authorities of their limited powers to deal with massive runs on their foreign exchange reserves. More liberal exchange policies usually mean a greater reliance on market-determined exchange rates. Price movements of foreign
exchange in this context absorb a good deal of the energy, which otherwise has to be faced by direct interventions in self-fulfilling prophecies, that are common in foreign exchange markets. Smaller exchange controls make the country more attractive to foreign capital and thus hospitality breeds confidence and contributes to further enlargement of capital flows.

### 2.4 Domestic incentives

This section comments on the recent legislation, updating the comments of section 2 of Carneiro \& Garcia 1995 (Carneiro, D.D and M.P. Garcia "Private Capital Flows to Brazil", ECLAC/UNDP, Serie Financiamiento del Desarrolia; $N^{\circ}$ 33, Santiago, Chile, October 1995.) Updated legislation is described in Annex 1.

The main objective of the Brazilian legislation regulating capital flows has historically been the repression of capital flight and tax avoidance. ... As domestic financial repression created obstacles to financial products to attract savers, the accumulation of wealth led naturally to an increased demand for foreign assets. Tax avoidance has understandably been at the center stage of the debate around the limits to liberalization of capital movements.

One thing is to speak of the legal restrictions to capital flows; quite another thing is to evaluate the effectiveness of such legal restrictions. Here expected costs and benefits of abiding by the law are an important determinant of the actual outcome. As an example, limits to capital movements are certainly easier to implement in countries that are more isolated geographically, like Brazil, than in countries with an intense movement of people and goods across the boundaries, as is the case in Europe, for example. After the financial liberalization of Uruguay, for example, capital controls became much more difficult to enforce in Brazil, and thus
the way was open to the process of liberalization which has been taking place since 1990 .

A second type of motivation for the legislation concerning foreign capital is of course nationalism. In the early 1960s, when the political strength of economic nationalism reached a peak in the post war years, foreign capital was seen by most influential political leaders at best as unwanted and a necessary evil a poor country would have to live with for a while. Concern with legal means to limit profit remittances of multinationals was the main motivation for the approval of Law 4131 of 1962 , which remains so far as the central piece of legislation regulating the presence of foreign capital in Brazil. The law $4,131 / 62$ was considerably softened by law 4,390/65, as well as by decree $557,662 / 65$, which increased the limits to the remittances of dividends. As noted by Franco (1990), this institutional setting proved to be robust enough to remain untouched for over twenty-five years.

Such unusual institutional stability has been affected by the recent movements starting in 1990, in favor of a higher degree of financial openness after the peak of the external debt crisis had past and the all-time high uncertainty concerning the rule presiding financial contracts in the domestic economy had been achieved following the Collor stabilization plan in March 1990.

After 1991, the legislation concerning foreign investment tended to be more receptive. Currently, there are several channels through which foreign investors may invest part of their portfolios in Brazil. As of February 1996, most of the capital inflow to Brazil corresponds to portfolio investments and currency loans. Foreign investment in Brazilian markets are basically of two types: fixed income or portfolio investment (stocks and derivatives), as a natural consequence of the extremely high real interest rates (see table 2.6).

Foreigners may invest in fixed income securities and are taxed differently from investors in stocks through Fixed Income Funds, created in late 1993 and regulated by the resolution 2,034 of the Conselho Monetario Nacional and Central Bank's circular 2,388. Those funds are constituted by either legal residents or with home-offices abroad. At least $35 \%$ must be held in public bonds and no more than $20 \%$ in private bonds. Those funds did not attract a very significant amount because of the upfront taxation of $7 \%$ and the possibilities of avoiding it through financial engineering, as mentioned below.

Foreign investment is nowadays concentrated in portfolio winvestment. Foreign portfolios were created and are regulated by the Annex IV of resolution 1,289 of 199 . Only institutional investors are allowed to invest in those funds: financial institutions, insurance companies and foreign investment funds. Through those funds institutional investors can acquire Brazilian stocks and derivatives assets. Recently, (February 1996) foreigners were forbidden to buy privatization securities bonds directly through Annex IV, but such securities can still be purchased through privatization funds and pay from this year onwards a $5 \%$ tax.

After an initial period when the capital inflow was instrumental to the recovery of foreign reserves in 1991 and 1992, the Central Bank, in the second half of 1993, imposed restrictions on capital inflows. At first, only fixed income investments were taxed, and since August 1995 this tax rose from 5 to $7 \%$ and loans not related to trade pay $5 \%$ transaction tax upon entrance (stock-market investments are still not taxed). With so many derivative markets, however, it is very hard to keep foreign investors from profiting of the very high real interest rates, as some regulators would prefer. To avoid fixed income taxation, one of the most widely used operations to transform an investment in stocks in an investment in fixed income is the so-called box
operation in the options market, a joint trade of four options (two calls and two puts) that produces a return that is known in advance, just like a bond. By an arbitrage argument, this return must equal the interest rate. As of August 1995, foreign capital was banned from box operations, as Annex IV funds were prohibited from operating in futures markets.

Table 2.10 shows the monthly evolution of foreign investment in funds and portfolio since January 1994. The statistics show that most foreign resources go to portfolio investment (Annex IV). Those investment amounted to US\$ 17.88 billion or $83 \%$ of total foreign investment in November 1995. Fixed income funds is the second "ere destination of foneign resources with a total amount of US\$ 3 billion or $14 \%$. And Annex II and other funds (such as privatization funds) have only $2.77 \%$ of total foreign investment.

Monthly data show a considerable increase of foreign investment following the Real Plan. Total foreign capital rose from an average of US\$ 15 billion in the first six months of 1994 to an average of US\$ 24 billion in the second half of the year. Nevertheless, the Mexican devaluation crisis in December and the Brazilian speculative crisis in March has smoothened this trend. Following the devaluation in March, international reserves losses amounted to US\$ 4 billion. This loss had been recovered by August 1995, when reserves reached US\$ 45 billion, around US\$ 14 billion above April figures, and surpassed by US\$ 5 billion its record high of September 1994.

Following the difficulties mentioned above, average capital stock amounted US\$ 19 billion in the first six months of 1995 , but they are still above last year's figures for the same period. Part of this reduction may be explained by the fall in stock prices, since stocks are around $77 \%$ of the Annex IV. Anyway, foreign investment has been increasing since May and from July to November, total capital stock averaged US\$ 22 billion.

### 2.5 Volatility and the response to short-run incentives

During and following the Mexican recent turmoil, Brazilian authorities have not shied away from adopting frequent changes in the legislation, especially those items concerning the taxation and other incentives to short term capital. To what extent have aggregate flows responded to short run incentives, and change of rules? Can we relate volatility to the implicit measures of risk computed in section 3 below?

As of January 1995, the last available data show net portfolio investment inflows of US\$ 715 million (US\$ 1,956 million inflow compared to US\$ 1, 240 million outflow . Since 1991, followirg ${ }^{\text {mix }}$ the adoption of new rules more hospitable to foreign portfolio investment, a total net inflow of US\$ 12.176 billion occurred, estimated to be worth 20.871 billion as of January. Of this amount, $90.84 \%$ went to the stock market and $4.72 \%$ in bonds (convertible debentures) and an estimated $3.75 \%$ are in so-called privatization monies, that is, government debt which may be used in privatization auctions.

Who administers such funds? (Citibank US\$ 3.798 billion, Boston US\$ 2.900 billion). A total of 518 portfolios are registered, 45\% are administered by Brazilian banking firms, non banks intermediaries such as brokers and special purpose funds are responsible for a share of $21 \%$ while pension funds only $1 \%$ of the total. See table 2.8 for data on bond issues in 1994 and 1995 and table 2.9 for lead managers in the same period.

WHERE DOES IT COME FROM? Central America fiscal havens $(24 \%$ of the 518 registered portfolios of Annex IV, $33 \%$ North America and 21\% Europe. For FDI origin see table 4.5 .

## 3. Timing and the composition of capital inflows

Resumption of growth prospects are essential to expectations of profitability of new projects. High inflation meant a permanent instability concerning basic rules and exchange rate prospects beyond indexation rules (examples: in spite of daily exchange rate indexation, real exchange rate was usually overvalued following inflationary upsurges). Timing and the propensity of foreign investors to wait and see, seems to be essential, in the case of Brazilian recent experience - share of FDI in capital flows after 1991 tend to corroborate this opinion.

Brazil was very slow to promote stabilization compared with Chile, Argentina and Mexico. Therefore other reforms were delayed. A good example was the protraction of privatization following the failure of the Collor stabilization attempt in 1990. But it was widely believed that, as soon as the hyper-inflation menace was left behind, and the state reformed, (Carneiro-Werneck, 1995; Werneck, 1995) a new phase of economic growth was to be expected. Basic reasoning was that the high uncertainty brought about by the macroeconomic instability and hyperinflation menace posed a high risk premium on the decision to invest, especially in long maturities projects.

### 3.1 Uncertainty and the cost of waiting

Recent approaches to the theory of investment (Pindyck, 1994) emphasize the role of the cost of waiting for a better opportunity as a determinant of investment outlays which may help to throw some light into the determinants of FDI-related inflows, compared to other form of capital movements. The basic idea is to make use of the option pricing approach: if the potential investor postpones his time of entry he pays for it, but he still retains the option to enter later, when a less uncertain evaluation of the prospects for reform can be made.

In this section we make use of a simple model which has been previously used by Dornbusch (1990) to explain the risk premium for the Mexican economy following the stabilization reforms. The basic idea is to make a few simplifying assumptions to model: the relationship between an investor's beliefs concerning the future evolution of the rates of return in a risky economy and the premium he demands to go ahead and invest instead of waiting and acquiring more information.

The beliefs of an investor may be taken as the probability distribution describing the possible future events of the economy. Since this is usually an unobservable characteristic of the investor, it is useful-to make use of simplifying assumptions to allow an explicit calculation of the relation between these beliefs and the risk premium.

The first assumption limits the range of possibilities for the evolution of the rates of return during the maturity of the investment. In the present case, it suffices to assume that there are two alternative states of the nature: one where policy reforms are assumed successful and the expected rate of return is high -the good state- and the bad state. At the moment of decision, reforms are but a promise and those who are brave enough to enter the country at early stages do so because they believe that they will reap good profits soon since the good state is around the corner.

Since there are only two possible states of nature at the recipient country, in the good state the return on an investment will be labeled rg , and rb in the bad state. In order to determine the possible paths to be followed by the rates of return, it is assumed that the investor's evaluation of states follows a Markov process: this means that the probability distribution for all future values of the process depends only on its current value, and is unaffected by past values of the process or by any other current information. In a bad state there is a probability $q$ of persistence
and a probability (1-q) of a shift to a favorable state. Thus, $q$ can be interpreted as the probability of bad news and (1-q) as the probability of that reforms will be approved and change the prospects of the economy. A further simplification made is that, once a favorable state prevails, it is expected to last forever.

A more difficult assumption that is needed in the present interpretation is that this process repeats itself at each point of decision. The investor can either wait and apply his wealth abroad affording to a known rate of return $x$, or realize a direct (irreversible) investment in this risky environment with two states of the world, where rates of return follow the pre-specified paths. Each investor is understood to have his own belief towards the future evolution of the rates of return, differences between economic agents reflecting their private sources of information and particular ideas about the environment, and their decisions are made separately. Finally, that investors are assumed to be risk-neutral, so that they differ only with respect to their assessment of the most convenient time of entry, since those who stay out keep their option to enter.

The relationship between premium and belief is obtained through the definition of this premium. As we begin at the bad state of the economy, we can show what would be the required premium for an investor to go ahead and invest, instead of taking a "wait and see" position, maintaining the option of entering once the favorable state is verified. The difference in return obtained between the value of these two possibilities defines the required premium, given by:

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*SSYMBOL 102 \f "Symbol"^U = [q/ (1+r-q)] (r-rb)
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This result confirms the so-called Bernanke's Bad News Principle that the option value of waiting depends only on the bad news, not the good news. The reason is that investors can always
benefit from the good state situation if they wait for it to invest.

We can observe in the equation above that the size of the required premium for an immediate commitment grows with the probability of persistence.

### 3.2 Protracted stabilization and covered interest parity

Table 3.1 shows a first estimate of the covered interest parity using $T$-bills interest rate, a riskless overnight monthly interest rate applied to Federal bonds backed assets and the expected rate of exchange devaluatton measured in the first date of each month in the BM\&F exchange futures market. The covered interest parity calculated as $\{(1+R N) /[(1+E)(1+T B)]-1\}$, where RN is the domestic interest rate, $E$ the expected devaluation in futures market and $T B$ the external interest rate, may be seen as a pure risk premium which depends on the probability of the different states of the economy.

Assembling the data on the risk premium and the defining rg, rb and $r$, the specified model may be used to determine the implicit belief concerning the future evolution of the rates of return. This belief reflects essentially an aggregate behavior, outcome of independent decisions. We need to choose the certain rate of return to be used, and the low rate of return of the pre-reform economy, rb.

In a preliminary exercise, the certain rate of return chosen was the US T-bills interest rate and the low rate of return was taken to be zero.

The last column of table 3.1 shows the results of this computation.

### 3.3 Quality of the capital flows

One may then seek an explanation for the timing of FDI inflows in the implicit probabilities of bad scenarios as suggested by the evolution of risk premia. The result of the repeated frustration with the stabilization attempts is that expected policy reforms which would be forthcoming following successful stabilization had to be postponed in each episode. Confidence in the improvement of the domestic scenario has thus been eluded several times leading to a premium on the correct timing.

Quality of flows should improve with the decrease in the probability of bad scenarios. That means thatihigher confidence in ... the progress of economic reforms should increase the share of FDI in total capital inflows.

Table 3.2 shows the share of direct investment in the capital inflows (both gross and net) in a monthly basis for 1992 through 1995, which may be read as a measure for the "quality of flows". For the last two years, figure 3.1 show the behavior of the net investment share in the net inflows plotted with the contemporaneous measure of risk assessment as described above.

A further exploration of this type of comparison relating the time path of economic policy with the behavior of the quality of inflows should help to assess the responsiveness of the flows to expectations on economic policy "fundamentals".
3.4 Econometric evidence on the long run effect of FDI

Gonzaga, Issler and Marone (PUC Discussion Paper 348, December 1995) in the context of assessing the relative importance of transitory and permanent shocks affecting the path of Brazilian GDP use co-integration analysis to measure the long run impact of FDI on output growth. Although they take the annual behavior of $F D I$ in
constant (deflated by what they call a "general price index") dollars as a proxy for overall policy credibility, they conclude: taken together with a general illiteracy index (illiterates as a proportion of the PEA - potential workforce?) and average schooling of the working force, they find a long run elasticity of $1 / 6$.

## 4. Sectoral aspects of FDI

The following data is presented on tables 4.1 through 4.12: - sectoral breakdown of the stock of foreign investment - agric, industry 83/95.2

- sectoral breakdown for manufacturing industry 75/80/85/ 90-95
- sectoral breakdown for growth rates and BNDES disbursements
a) One argument for the desirability of FDI relatively to monetary inflows is their welcome "real investment impact" as opposed to unwelcome monetary and foreign-exchange markets impacts of financial inflows: expansionary demand and appreciation.
b) In the case of Brazil, FDI without money means import of capital goods which have a direct sectoral impact, which vears on the development of the capital goods industry; increase the demand for protection. Therefore, there are factors beyond macropolicies which may play a role in the judgement of the desired composition of foreign capital.

A brief look into broad sector destination show that the share of manufacturing industry has fallen from the late eighties (71\%) to mid nineties (55.4). Services seems to absorb higher and higher share. Within manufacturing industry, there has been a noticeable increase in transport equipment and a decrease in tobacco.
c) What does the past behavior of foreign investment data tell us? In view of the role played by industrial policies and administrative credit allocation in the Brazilian economy in the
seventies and the eighties, two possible hypotheses concerning the behavior of foreign investment may be tested:
(i) follow the leader: in view of the high risk of $L R$ investment projects, preferred sectors as evidenced by BNDES credit allocation (see table 4.1) may be more attractive, as they may be judged as more likely to receive preferential treatment: continuity of projects, protection in case of external trouble, for example.
(ii) fill in the blanks: low priority sectors may be those where profitability attracts private investment without the need of government support through official credit -therefore data should evidence complementarity.

A closer look into the behavior of the sectoral data will be attempted in search for a better understanding of the available evidence. The precarious nature of the stocks data is something which will have to be dealt with.

## 5. Policy conclusions and pending issues

a) Brazilian experience is rich and varied. In the past, nationalism, control of capital flight and dirigist industrial policy has been the rule. More recent is somewhere in between Mexican liberalization of capital account uncertainties derived of flexible exchange rate and Argentina's fixed exchange rate with full convertibility. In both cases, and Brazil is no exception, fiscal discipline seems essential to signal favorable scenarios.
b) Are there policy lessons which tell us how to prevent capital from fleeing the country in bad times? Capital flight was low before 1986, even at the worst of the early eighties. At that time external debt was public, and banks money was tied to long run investment projects. Do industrial policies make a difference in the composition of inflows? In the late eighties, external
moratorium plus domestic uncertainty with high inflation increased capital flight. Frustrated stabilization attempts plus delay in external debt restructuring are the main reasons behind radical changes in attitudes in the early nineties. Financial openness of neighbors made a difference and so does the composition of supply. At the peak of high uncertainty, after the Collor I hijacking of domestic financial assets, liberalization of rules and high interest rates were essential element for stabilization. But abundance of external liquidity makes quite a difference.
c) What can be said of the supply-side determinants, of the impact of financial innovations? Does the size of the economy make a difference in today's flows as it did in the eärly eighties? Are there limits to explore the attractiveness of a large country whose bankruptcy entails a systemic risk?
d) Following the Mexican crisis of $1994 / 95$, pragmatic policies concerning both exchange rate regime and the need to discourage volatile short term capital when excessive appreciation threatened trade balance prospects and enhanced catastrophic scenarios. Control over appreciation was seen as welcome and suggests that there is some advantage in being a latecomer. Improvement of quality of flows on a permanent basis seem to require more than sensible macropolicies, but also a more permanent and consistent stance concerning the role of private sector in investment process as a whole.

On the topic of policies designed to control capital flows, three issues may be mentioned and explored:
(i) The first one is concerned with conflicting objectives, and may be stated as "to control the volatility while minimizing the obstacles to capital mobility". In the presence of today's facilities to move money to financially open neighbor economies
(Paraguay and Uruguay), the inefficiency of old fashioned controls are clear.
(ii) A related issue is the existence of the so-called "floating rate exchange market" established in December 1988 (Resolution 1532) through which most transactions are made, that were set before at the old "parallel" or "black market" rates. The trend of liberalization in the past years has been a progressive legalization of all transactions. In practical terms, only tax evasion and other illegal activities such as drug-related payments are today made through the parallel market. Two policy alternatives have been discussed in this context: the abolition or the adoption of stricter controls of transactions in the floating rate market; or the abandonment of the current practice, by the central Bank to equalize the rates of exchange in the commercial and the floating markets. In presence of a serious run against the Real, resort to the dual market (by simply letting the gap between the two rates widen, as in the 1980s) would impose a higher cost on capital flight, thereby creating an automatic "tax" on transfers abroad.
(iii) The third one is the dilemma between taxation of high volatile capital movements versus prohibition or a quarantine system. In the early seventies, Brazilian authorities made use of a quarantine system by requiring a deposit during six months, no interest paid at the Central Bank for all foreign loans from private banks. In the recent years, there is a clear preference for taxation as briefly described above.
(iv) Finally, policy discussions on these matters have often involved discussions about the discrimination of controls "by type" of capital, or "by sector of destination", as frequent waves of industrial policy arguments creep in and establish themselves in more respectable clothes in times of balance of payments difficulties.

## ANNEX 1

Legislation on Foreign Capital (from Carneiro and Garcia 1995, updated).
a) Sociedades de Investimento - Capital Estrangeiro (Investment Companies - Foreign Capital):

These companies were created and regulated by the Annex $I$ of Resolution 1289 of the National Monetary Council, dated 03/20/87. These companies may be composed of individuals or legal entities resident, domiciled or with head-offices abroad, with the aim to invest in Brazilian variable income securities. The investments have to be managed by a Brazilian financial institution authorized by CVM (the Brazilian SEC).

As companies they are regulated by the appropriate law of public companies (Lei das S.A.), which is very demanding for an investment fund. All investments shall be subject to registration at the Central Bank to allow for later repatriation of cash dividends and capital gains. The minimum percentage invested in shares or convertible debentures is $50 \%$. Capital gains are exempted from income tax, but cash dividends and monetary payments are currently taxed at a $15 \%$ rate.

The total amount of funds in these companies is quite small, US\$ 52.87 million (November/95).
b) Fundos de Investimento - Capital Estrangeiro (Investment Funds - Foreign Capital):

These Funds were created and regulated by the Annex II of Resolution 1289 of the National Monetary Council, dated 03/20/87. These funds may be composed of foreign individuals, corporations or
other collective investment entities organized abroad resident, domiciled or with head-offices abroad, with the aim to invest in Brazilian securities. These Funds shall be managed solely by an investment bank, brokerage house or securities house authorized by the CVM.

All investments shall be subject to registration at the Central Bank to allow for later repatriation of dividends and capital gains. The minimum percentage invested in stocks is $70 \%$. Capital gains are exempted from income tax, but monetary payments are currently taxed at a 15\% rate.

The total amount of funds in these funds is quite small, US\$ 275.11 million (November/95).

Besides (a) and (b), the Resolution 1289 in its Annex III created and regulated the Carteira de Títulos e Valores Mobiliarios (Bonds and Securities Portfolios maintained in Brazil). Currently, this option is hardly used. The total amount invested through Annex III, Funds of Foreign Capital Conversion and Privatization Funds Foreign Capital amounts to US\$ 266.51 million (November 1995).
c) Carteiras de Valores Mobiliarios (Securities Portfolios for Institutional Investors) :

These Portfolios are the most widely used instrument to invest in Brazilian stock and derivative markets. They were created and regulated by the Annex IV of Resolution 1289. Annex IV was actually enacted by Resolution 1832, dated 05/31/91: Only foreign institutional investors may invest in those portfolios. Examples of institutional investors that qualify for the use of the Annex IV are Pension Funds, Portfolios belonging to Financial Institutions, Insurance Companies, and Foreign Investment Funds. The management of the portfolio will be undertaken by the institution operating in Brazil and granted authorization by the

CVM. Through Annex IV, Foreign Mutual Funds were able to invest in the Brazilian stock markets, each one forming its own portfolio. Previously they would have to invest in other mutual funds. Also, American mutual funds are forbidden from investing in other mutual funds, to avoid fraudulent schemes.

All investments shall be subject to registration at the Central Bank to allow for later repatriation of dividends and capital gains. Currently, these Portfolios cannot invest in fixed income securities, except in very restricted ones. Those rather restrictive fixed income investments are subject to a $15 \%$ withholding income tax. The idea is that all foreign investment in fixed income securities be made through Fixed Income Funds (item (e) below). These Fixed Income Funds pay a 9\% ôentranceö tax, while the Variable Income Portfolios pay $1 \%$.

Capital gains are exempted from income tax, but monetary payments are currently taxed at a $15 \%$ rate.

The total amount of funds in these portfolios is US\$ 17, 882.18 million (November/95). This option is by far the most widely used entrance to foreign investment in variable income financial instruments.
d) Depositary Receipts (D.R.):

The Annex $V$ of Resolution 1289, enacted by Resolution 1927, dated 05/18/92, regulates the issuance of the DRs. Until now, DRs have not yet become a widely used option, but their importance is likely to grow in the future as a source of cheaper capital for corporations.
e) Fundos de Renda Fixa - Capital Estrangeiro (Fixed Income Funds for Foreign Investors):

Only through these funds may foreign investors invest in Brazilian private and public fixed income securities. They wexe created and regulated by Resolution 2034 of the National Monetary Council, dated 12/17/93, and by Circular Letter 2388 of the Central Bank.

These funds may be composed of corporate legal entities domiciled or with head-offices abroad with the aim to invest in Brazilian fixed income securities, as well as foreign mutual funds. The management of these funds may be handled by a multiple bank with an investment portfolio, an investment bank, a stocks and securities brokerage house, or a stocks and securities dealership, under direct responsibility and supervision of the administration of the institution.

The funds assets have to be at least $35 \%$ invested in papers issued by the National Treasury or Central bank bonds, and no more than $20 \%$ may be invested in fixed-income papers or acceptances by financial institutions. All investments have to be recorded at the Central Bank to allow for later repatriation of yields and capital gains.

Capital gains associated with stock and futures market operations are not subject to withholding tax. All real income (except capital gains on stocks) are subject to $15 \%$ withholding income tax. All fixed income investments are currently subject to a 9\% tax (IOF - Tax on Financial Transactions). This tax was conceived to deter the capital inflow attracted by the large interest rates in Brazil.

The total amount of funds in these funds is US\$ 3,017 million (November 1995).
f) Contratos de Fechamento de Cambio e Carta Circular No 5 (The Exchange Closing Contract and The Central Bank Circular Letter \#5 - Foreign Investors Accounts) :

The Exchange Closing Contract as well as the Circular Letter \# 5 are instruments that foreign investors may use to participate in Brazilian financial and capital markets. The regulations on those options are very lax, but they are not very widely used because they subject the investors to a $25 \%$ (variable real income) and $30 \%$ (fixed real income) tax, much more than options (c) and (e), the most widely used. A tax on short term (less than 16 work days) financial transactions (IOF) also applies.
Total foreign investments plus reinvestments Includes all investment lines of activity (in US $\$ 1000,00$ )

|  | Mining | Manufacturing industry | Agriculture | Cattle raising | Fishing | Public utilities | Services | Others | Total |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Dec-89 | 837098 | 24389629 | 237584 | 0 | 0 | 58945 | 7886332 | 876938 | 34286526 |
| Jun-90 | 858109 | 24378567 | 236230 | 0 | 0 | 61180 | 8579077 | 924184 | 35037347 |
| Dec-90 | 836161 | 25729204 | 242729 | 0 | 0 | 63531 | 9258390 | 1013357 | 37143372 |
| Jun-91 | 791498 | 24309871 | 233027 | 0 | 0 | 59398 | 8914215 | 1083469 | 35391478 |
| Dec-91 | 821050 | 26156188 | 358164 | 0 | 0 | 62714 | 10090540 | 1091536 | 38580192 |
| Jun-92 | 821736 | 26098484 | 398398 | 0 | 0 | 65234 | 11601227 | 1135515 | 40120594 |
| Dec-92 | 793554 | 25571317 | 438426 | 0 | 0 | 62675 | 11974959 | 1134135 | 39975066 |
| Jun-93 | 823311 | 26776020 | 321498 | 0 | 0 | 62661 | 12576384 | 1293268 | 41853142 |
| Dec-93 | 821160 | 27301129 | 322386 | 0 | 0 | 65636 | 17212996 | 1305411 | 47028718 |
| Jun-94 | 823311 | 28862523 | 335576 | 122567 | 14323 | 66327 | 23439843 | 676731 | 54341201 |
| Dec-94 | 1086608 | 28955022 | 308656 | 123374 | 14278 | 67537 | 25252324 | 741050 | 56548849 |
| Mar-95 | 1118401 | 31450405 | 324686 | 128992 | 14818 | 68523 | 22793049 | 872809 | 56771683 |

Percentage in total value

|  | Mining | Manufacturing industry | Agriculture | Cattle raising | Fishing | Public utilities | Services | Others | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Dec-89 | 2.44\% | 71.13\% | 0.69\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.17\% | 23.00\% | 2.56\% | 100.00\% |
| Jun-90 | 2.45\% | 69.58\% | 0.67\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.17\% | 24.49\% | 2.64\% | 100.00\% |
| Dec-90 | 2.25\% | 69.27\% | 0.65\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.17\% | 24.93\% | 2.73\% | 100.00\% |
| Jun-91 | 2.24\% | 68.69\% | 0.66\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.17\% | 25.19\% | 3.06\% | 100.00\% |
| Dec-91 | 2.13\% | 67.80\% | 0.93\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.16\% | 26.15\% | 2.83\% | 100.00\% |
| Jun-92 | 2.05\% | 65.05\% | 0.99\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.16\% | 28.92\% | 2.83\% | 100.00\% |
| Dec-92 | 1.99\% | 63.97\% | 1.10\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.16\% | 29.96\% | 2.84\% | 100.00\% |
| Jun-93 | 1.97\% | 63.98\% | 0.77\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.15\% | 30.05\% | 3.09\% | 100.00\% |
| Dec-93 | 1.75\% | 58.05\% | 0.69\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.14\% | 36.60\% | 2.78\% | 100.00\% |
| Jun-94 | 1.52\% | 53.11\% | 0.62\% | 0.23\% | 0.03\% | 0.12\% | 43.13\% | 1.25\% | 100.00\% |
| Dec-94 | 1.92\% | 51.20\% | 0.55\% | 0.22\% | 0.03\% | 0.12\% | 44.66\% | 1.31\% | 100.00\% |
| Mar-95 | 1.97\% | 55.40\% | 0.57\% | 0.23\% | 0.03\% | 0.12\% | 40.15\% | 1.54\% | 100.00\% |

[^1]Includes all investment lines of activity (in US\$ 1000,00 )

|  | Mining | Manufacturing industry | Agriculture | Cattle raising | Fishing | Public utilities | Services | Others | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Dec-89 | 721941 | 16102918 | 142888 | 0 | 0 | 49460 | 5939715 | 707059 | 23663981 |
| Jun-90 | 734406 | 15868585 | 141543 | 0 | 0 | 51153 | 6561160 | 747647 | 24104494 |
| Dec-90 | 748351 | 16583754 | 147443 | 0 | 0 | 53023 | 7057761 | 820870 | 25411202 |
| Jun-91 | 708036 | 16035178 | 138424 | 0 | 0 | 49757 | 6941455 | 902966 | 24775816 |
| Dec-91 | 733021 | 16929616 | 262307 | 0 | 0 | 52355 | 7868598 | 899299 | 26745196 |
| Jun-92 | 733531 | 16930117 | 266542 | 0 | 0 | 54176 | 9329038 | 940442 | 28253846 |
| Dec-92 | 706893 | 16917296 | 281803 | 0 | 0 | 51934 | 9859747 | 953080 | 28770753 |
| Jun-93 | 733531 | 18089327 | 167325 | 0 | 0 | 52153 | 10653495 | 1110094 | 30805925 |
| Dec-93 | 734560 | 18652517 | 168877 | 0 | 0 | 56079 | 15394756 | 1124628 | 36131417 |
| Jun-94 | 733531 | 19711831 | 176352 | 121917 | 12169 | 56390 | 21478293 | 541003 | 42831486 |
| Dec-94 | 904756 | 19785968 | 148776 | 122720 | 12151 | 57446 | 23259091 | 602305 | 44893213 |
| Mar-95 | 925584 | 20856959 | 156790 | 127959 | 12372 | 57900 | 20533238 | 724520 | 43395322 |

Percentage in total value

|  | Mining | Manufacturing industry | Agriculture | Cattle raising | Fishing | Public utilities | Services | Others | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Dec-89 | 3.05\% | 68.05\% | 0.60\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.21\% | 25.10\% | 2.99\% | 100.00\% |
| Jun-90 | 3.05\% | 65.83\% | 0.59\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.21\% | 27.22\% | 3.10\% | 100.00\% |
| Dec-90 | 2.94\% | 65.26\% | 0.58\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.21\% | 27.77\% | 3.23\% | 100.00\% |
| Jun-91 | 2.86\% | 64.72\% | 0.56\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.20\% | 28.02\% | 3.64\% | 100.00\% |
| Dec-91 | 2.74\% | 63.30\% | 0.98\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.20\% | 29.42\% | 3.36\% | 100.00\% |
| Jun-92 | 2.60\% | 59.92\% | 0.94\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.19\% | 33.02\% | 3.33\% | 100.00\% |
| Dec-92 | 2.46\% | 58.80\% | 0.98\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.18\% | 34.27\% | 3.31\% | 100.00\% |
| Jun-93 | 2.38\% | 58.72\% | 0.54\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.17\% | 34.58\% | 3.60\% | 100.00\% |
| Dec-93 | 2.03\% | 51.62\% | 0.47\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.16\% | 42.61\% | 3.11\% | 100.00\% |
| Jun-94 | 1.71\% | 46.02\% | 0.41\% | 0.28\% | 0.03\% | 0.13\% | 50.15\% | 1.26\% | 100.00\% |
| Dec-94 | 2.02\% | 44.07\% | 0.33\% | 0.27\% | 0.03\% | 0.13\% | 51.81\% | 1.34\% | 100.00\% |
| Mar-95 | 2.13\% | 48.06\% | 0.36\% | 0.29\% | 0.03\% | 0.13\% | 47.32\% | 1.67\% | 100.00\% |

[^2]All lines of activity
Total foreign reinvestments
Includes all investment lines of activity (in US\$ 1000,00 )

|  | Mining | Manufacturing industry | Agriculture | Cattle raising | Fishing | Public utilities | Services | Others | Total |
| :---: | :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: | :---: |
| Dec-89 | 837098 | 8286711 | 94696 | 0 | 0 | 9485 | 1946617 | 169879 | 11344486 |
| Jun-90 | 858109 | 8509982 | 94687 | 0 | 0 | 10027 | 2017917 | 176537 | 11667259 |
| Dec-90 | 836161 | 9145450 | 95286 | 0 | 0 | 10508 | 2200629 | 192487 | 12480521 |
| Jun-91 | 791498 | 8274693 | 94603 | 0 | 0 | 9641 | 1972760 | 180503 | 11323698 |
| Dec-91 | 821050 | 9200525 | 95857 | 0 | 0 | 10359 | 2221942 | 192237 | 12541970 |
| Jun-92 | 821736 | 9164822 | 131856 | 0 | 0 | 11058 | 2272189 | 195073 | 12596734 |
| Dec-92 | 793554 | 8670287 | 156623 | 0 | 0 | 10741 | 2115212 | 181055 | 11927472 |
| Jun-93 | 823311 | 8718308 | 154173 | 0 | 0 | 10508 | 1922889 | 183174 | 11812363 |
| Dec-93 | 821160 | 8643617 | 153509 | 0 | 0 | 9557 | 1818240 | 180783 | 11626866 |
| Jun-94 | 823311 | 9150692 | 159224 | 650 | 2154 | 9937 | 1961550 | 135728 | 12243246 |
| Dec-94 | 1086608 | 9169054 | 159880 | 654 | 2127 | 10091 | 1993233 | 138745 | 12560392 |
| Mar-95 | 1118401 | 10593446 | 167896 | 1033 | 2446 | 10623 | 2259820 | 148289 | 14301954 |

Percentage in total value

|  | Mining | Manufacturing industry | Agriculture | Cattle raising | Fishing | Public utilities | Services | Others | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Dec-89 | 7.38\% | 73.05\% | 0.83\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.08\% | 17.16\% | 1.50\% | 100.00\% |
| Jun-90 | 7.35\% | 72.94\% | 0.81\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.09\% | 17.30\% | 1.51\% | 100.00\% |
| Dec-90 | 6.70\% | 73.28\% | 0.76\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.08\% | 17.63\% | 1.54\% | 100.00\% |
| Jun-91 | 6.99\% | 73.07\% | 0.84\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.09\% | 17.42\% | 1.59\% | 100.00\% |
| Dec-91 | 6.55\% | 73.36\% | 0.76\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.08\% | 17.72\% | 1.53\% | 100.00\% |
| Jun-92 | 6.52\% | 72.76\% | 1.05\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.09\% | 18.04\% | 1.55\% | 100.00\% |
| Dec-92 | 6.65\% | 72.69\% | 1.31\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.09\% | 17.73\% | 1.52\% | 100.00\% |
| Jun-93 | 6.97\% | 73.81\% | 1.31\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.09\% | 16.28\% | 1.55\% | 100.00\% |
| Dec-93 | 7.06\% | 74.34\% | 1.32\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.08\% | 15.64\% | 1.55\% | 100.00\% |
| Jun-94 | 6.72\% | 74.74\% | 1.30\% | 0.01\% | 0.02\% | 0.08\% | 16.02\% | 1.11\% | 100.00\% |
| Dec-94 | 8.65\% | 73.00\% | 1.27\% | 0.01\% | 0.02\% | 0.08\% | 15.87\% | 1.10\% | 100.00\% |
| Mar-95 | 7.82\% | 74.07\% | 1.17\% | 0.01\% | 0.02\% | 0.07\% | 15.80\% | 1.04\% | 100.00\% |

[^3]Total foreign investment plus reinvestments
Includes participation by region (in US\$ 1000,00 )

|  | EUA | Europe | Caribbean | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Dec-89 | 10224388 | 16230484 | 1764885 | 28219757 |
| Jun-90 | 10213193 | 16857897 | 1900611 | 28971701 |
| Dec-90 | 10487650 | 18442347 | 1743013 | 30673010 |
| Jun-91 | 10514894 | 16413426 | 1860871 | 28789191 |
| Dec-91 | 10959176 | 18558222 | 2001406 | 31518804 |
| Jun-92 | 12452401 | 19566099 | 1236407 | 33254907 |
| Dec-92 | 12180893 | 18316323 | 2196922 | 32694138 |
| Jun-93 | 12884914 | 18822515 | 2901014 | 34608443 |
| Dec-93 | 14896800 | 19922754 | 4892083 | 39711637 |

Percentage in total value

| Dec-89 | EUA | Europe | Caribbean |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Jun-90 | $36.23 \%$ | $57.51 \%$ | $6.25 \%$ |
| Dec-90 | $35.25 \%$ | $58.19 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
| Jun-91 | $34.19 \%$ | $60.13 \%$ | $6.56 \%$ |
| Dec-91 | $36.52 \%$ | $57.01 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
| Jun-92 | $34.77 \%$ | $58.88 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
| Dec-92 | $37.45 \%$ | $58.84 \%$ | $6.35 \%$ |
| Jun-93 | $37.26 \%$ | $36.02 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
| Dec-93 | $37.23 \%$ | $54.39 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | $37.51 \%$ | $50.00 \%$ |  |
|  |  | $50.17 \%$ | $8.38 \%$ |

Europe includes: Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom, Denmark, Greece, Austria, Malta, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Ireland, Iceland, Yugoslavia, Liechtenstein, Poland, Estonia, Gibraltar, Czech Republic, Hungary and Russia. Caribbean includes: Costa Rica, Panama, Netherlands Antilles, The Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Barbados, Dominican Republic, Virgin Islands, British Virgin Islands and French Guiana.

Total foreign investment
Includes participation by region (in US\$ 1000,00 )

|  | EUA | Europe | Caribbean | Total |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Dec-89 | 7149817 | 10273478 | 1327651 | 18750946 |
| Jun-90 | 7134472 | 10575472 | 1398259 | 19108203 |
| Dec-90 | 7381478 | 11434925 | 1429298 | 20245701 |
| Jun-91 | 7421882 | 10603368 | 1464243 | 19489493 |
| Dec-91 | 7809455 | 11736029 | 1597381 | 21142865 |
| Jun-92 | 9195689 | 12518612 | 1087194 | 22801495 |
| Dec-92 | 9041556 | 12001684 | 1818546 | 22861786 |
| Jun-93 | 9779912 | 12673938 | 2436530 | 24890380 |
| Dec-93 | 11888165 | 13902720 | 4438739 | 30229624 |

Percentage in total value

|  | EUA | Europe | Caribbean | Total |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :--- |
| Dec-89 | $38.13 \%$ | $54.79 \%$ | $7.08 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
| Jun-90 | $37.34 \%$ | $55.35 \%$ | $7.32 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
| Dec-90 | $36.46 \%$ | $56.48 \%$ | $7.06 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
| Jun-91 | $38.08 \%$ | $54.41 \%$ | $7.51 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
| Dec-91 | $36.94 \%$ | $55.51 \%$ | $7.56 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
| Jun-92 | $40.33 \%$ | $54.90 \%$ | $4.77 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
| Dec-92 | $39.55 \%$ | $52.50 \%$ | $7.95 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
| Jun-93 | $39.29 \%$ | $50.92 \%$ | $9.79 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
| Dec-93 | $39.33 \%$ | $45.99 \%$ | $14.68 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |

Europe includes: Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom, Denmark, Greece, Austria, Malta, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Ireland, Iceland, Yugoslavia, Liechtenstein, Poland, Estonia, Gibraltar, Czech Republic, Hungary and Russia. Caribbean includes: Costa Rica, Panama, Netherlands Antilles, The Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Barbados, Dominican Republic, Virgin Islands, British Virgin Islands and French Guiana.




Source: Banco Central do Brasil
Statistical Supplement

Source: Banco Central do Brasil
Statistical Supplement
Public utility services
Total foreign investments plus reinvestments
Includes participation in the Public utility service line of activity (in US\$ 1000,00 )

|  | Dec-89 | Gas production | Maritime and river transportatio | Highway transport | Airlane transport | Sanitation | Water |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | 48 | 19637 | 33583 | 2902 | 1649 | 1126 | 58945 |
| Jun-90 | 52 | 21944 | 33444 | 2920 | 1664 | 1156 | 61180 |
| Dec-90 | 57 | 22798 | 31941 | 5595 | 1862 | 1278 | 63531 |
| Jun-91 | 49 | 21907 | 29986 | 4838 | 1551 | 1067 | 59398 |
| Dec-91 | 26705 | 31048 | 5821 | 1833 | 1251 | 62714 |  |
| Jun-92 | 56 | 24393 | 31229 | 6458 | 1829 | 1269 | 65234 |
| Dec-92 | 56 | 23771 | 29779 | 6187 | 1718 | 1175 | 62675 |
| Jun-93 | 45 | 24345 | 29479 | 6030 | 1634 | 1129 | 62661 |
| Dec-93 | 44 | 22403 | 34368 | 6120 | 1603 | 1098 | 65636 |
| Jun-94 | 44 | 24649 | 30673 | 6511 | 1756 | 2692 | 66327 |
| Dec-94 | 46 | 24923 | 30207 | 6598 | 1799 | 3964 | 67537 |
| Mar-95 | 46 | 25643 | 29504 | 7203 | 2027 | 4098 | 68523 |

Percentage in total value

|  | Gas production | Maritime and river transportatio | Highway transport | Airlane transport | Sanitation | Water | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Dec-89 | 0.08\% | 33.31\% | 56.97\% | 4.92\% | 2.80\% | 1.91\% | 100.00\% |
| Jun-90 | 0.08\% | 35.87\% | 54.66\% | 4.77\% | 2.72\% | 1.89\% | 100.00\% |
| Dec-90 | 0.09\% | 35.88\% | 50.28\% | 8.81\% | 2.93\% | 2.01\% | 100.00\% |
| Jun-91 | 0.08\% | 36.88\% | 50.48\% | 8.15\% | 2.61\% | 1.80\% | 100.00\% |
| Dec-91 | 0.09\% | 36.20\% | 49.51\% | 9.28\% | 2.92\% | 1.99\% | 100.00\% |
| Jun-92 | 0.09\% | 37.39\% | 47.87\% | 9.90\% | 2.80\% | 1.95\% | 100.00\% |
| Dec-92 | 0.07\% | 37.93\% | 47.51\% | 9.87\% | 2.74\% | 1.87\% | 100.00\% |
| Jun-93 | 0.07\% | 38.85\% | 47.05\% | 9.62\% | 2.61\% | 1.80\% | 100.00\% |
| Dec-93 | 0.07\% | 34.13\% | 52.36\% | 9.32\% | 2.44\% | 1.67\% | 100.00\% |
| Jun-94 | 0.07\% | 37.16\% | 46.25\% | 9.82\% | 2.65\% | 4.06\% | 100.00\% |
| Dec-94 | 0.07\% | 36.90\% | 44.73\% | 9.77\% | 2.66\% | 5.87\% | 100.00\% |
| Mar-95 | 0.07\% | 37.42\% | 43.06\% | 10.51\% | 2.96\% | 5.98\% | 100.00\% |

[^4]Total foreign investments plus reinvestment
Includes participation by country (in US $\$ 1000,00$ )

|  | Costa Rica | Panama | Netherlands Antille | The Bahamas | Bermuda | Cayman Islands | Others | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Dec-89 | 302 | 838393 | 326489 | 152626 | 216024 | 208157 | 22894 | 1764885 |
| Jun-90 | 301 | 939041 | 345523 | 138986 | 186798 | 225380 | 64582 | 1900611 |
| Dec-90 | 301 | 776636 | 362655 | 118506 | 186597 | 224558 | 73760 | 1743013 |
| Jun-91 | 301 | 851677 | 363201 | 121822 | 186928 | 246436 | 90506 | 1860871 |
| Dec-91 | 301 | 859316 | 415620 | 127442 | 188557 | 307589 | 102581 | 2001406 |
| Jun-92 | 301 | 506547 | 157103 | 160912 | 76345 | 333028 | 2171 | 1236407 |
| Dec-92 | 301 | 864229 | 418854 | 231122 | 209387 | 470927 | 2102 | 2196922 |
| Jun-93 | 300 | 964007 | 453258 | 397173 | 199009 | 777307 | 109960 | 2901014 |
| Dec-93 | 301 | 985927 | 550379 | 841018 | 195789 | 2182441 | 136228 | 4892083 |


Others includes: Barbados, Dominican Republic, British Virgin Islands, Virgin Islands and French Guiana.

[^5]$\because \therefore$

|  | Costa Rica | Panama | Netherlands Antille | The Bahamas | Bermuda | Cayman Islands | Others | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Dec-89 | 1 | 344789 | 20462 | 15574 | 27723 | 25710 | 2975 | 437234 |
| Jun-90 | 1 | 437978 | 13603 | 6348 | 14719 | 27584 | 2119 | 502352 |
| Dec-90 | 1 | 248740 | 14534 | 6545 | 15193 | 26555 | 2147 | 313715 |
| Jun-91 | 1 | 333870 | 12971 | 6154 | 15250 | 26307 | 2075 | 396628 |
| Dec-91 | 1 | 336804 | 14624 | 6381 | 15411 | 24345 | 6459 | 404025 |
| Jun-92 | 0 | 125183 | 4611 | 2052 | 2012 | 13511 | 1844 | 149213 |
| Dec-92 | 0 | 325015 | 14025 | 6178 | 11069 | 20326 | 1763 | 378376 |
| Jun-93 | 0 | 394027 | 14603 | 5328 | 23814 | 20602 | 6110 | 464484 |
| Dec-93 | 0 | 386326 | 14553 | 5041 | 23197 | 17974 | 6253 | 453344 |

[^6]Source: Banco Central do Brasil


[^0]:    - Progress Research Report; not to be quoted without permission.

[^1]:    Source: Banco Central do Brasil

[^2]:    Source: Banco Central do Brasil

[^3]:    Source: Banco Central do Brasil
    Statistical Supplement

[^4]:    Source: Banco Central do Brasil
    Statistical Supplement

[^5]:    Source: Banco Central do Brasil

[^6]:    Percentage in total value

    | Costa Rica | Panama | Netherlands Antille | The Bahamas | Bermuda | Cayman Islands | Others | Total |
    | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
    | $0.00 \%$ | $78.86 \%$ | $4.68 \%$ | $3.56 \%$ | $6.34 \%$ | $5.88 \%$ | $0.68 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
    | $0.00 \%$ | $87.19 \%$ | $2.71 \%$ | $1.26 \%$ | $2.93 \%$ | $5.49 \%$ | $0.42 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
    | $0.00 \%$ | $79.29 \%$ | $4.63 \%$ | $2.09 \%$ | $4.84 \%$ | $8.46 \%$ | $0.68 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
    | $0.00 \%$ | $84.18 \%$ | $3.27 \%$ | $1.55 \%$ | $3.84 \%$ | $6.63 \%$ | $0.52 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
    | $0.00 \%$ | $83.36 \%$ | $3.62 \%$ | $1.58 \%$ | $3.81 \%$ | $6.03 \%$ | $1.60 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
    | $0.00 \%$ | $83.90 \%$ | $3.09 \%$ | $1.38 \%$ | $1.35 \%$ | $9.05 \%$ | $1.24 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
    | $0.00 \%$ | $85.90 \%$ | $3.71 \%$ | $1.63 \%$ | $2.93 \%$ | $5.37 \%$ | $0.47 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
    | $0.00 \%$ | $84.83 \%$ | $3.14 \%$ | $1.15 \%$ | $5.13 \%$ | $4.44 \%$ | $1.32 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
    | $0.00 \%$ | $85.22 \%$ | $3.21 \%$ | $1.11 \%$ | $5.12 \%$ | $3.96 \%$ | $1.38 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |

    Others includes: Barbados, Dominican Republic, British Virgin Islands, Virgin Islands and French Guiana.

